Abstract-A5/1 is a stream cipher used in the GSM standard. Several time-memory trade-off attacks against A5/1 have been proposed, most notably the recent attack by Biryukov, Shamir and Wagner, which can break A5/1 in seconds using huge precomputation time and memory. This paper presents a completely different attack on A5/1, based on ideas from correlation attacks. Whereas time-memory trade-off attacks have a complexity which is exponential with the shift register length, the complexity of the proposed attack is almost independent of the shift register length. Our implementation of the suggested attack breaks A5/1 in a few minutes using 2-5 minutes of conversation plaintext.
I. INTRODUCTION
A5/1 is the strong version of the encryption algorithm used in the GSM standard to provide privacy for more than 130 million customers in the air link of their voice and data communication. A sketch of the design of A5/1 was leaked in 1994, and the exact design was reversed engineered in 1999 by Briceno [3] from an actual GSM telephone. A5/1 is a stream cipher based on irregular clocking of three linear feedback shift registers. The key size is 64 bits and the keystream is produced by xoring the output from the three registers.
The first attacks were either "Guess-and-Determine" type of attacks, or time-memory tradeoff attacks, requiring about ¢ ¡ ¤ £ ¦ ¥ § ¡ © steps of computation [4] . At Fast Software Encryption 2000, Biryukov, Shamir and Wagner [2] presented an improved attack on A5/1, which required only a few seconds to a few minutes computation on a PC. This attack is based on the time-memory tradeoff attack by Golic [4] , and requires storage of about 150-300 Gbyte of precomputed data as well as a long precomputation phase. Although this is a very impressive attack, it is still only a time-memory trade-off attack with expensive asymptotic behavior. If one would improve A5/1 by simply increasing the lengths of the shift registers, say twice as long, this kind of attack would no longer be possible to apply in practice. Another attack was presented at Indocrypt 2000 by Biham and Dunkelman [1] . There attack breaks the cipher within ¤ © A5/1 clocking assuming ¢ ¤ £ bits of keystream available, but also this attack has an expensive asymptotic behavior. Recently, Krause [6] , so the complexity is again exponential in the shift registers length. This paper presents a completely different attack on A5/1, based on ideas from correlation attacks, see e.g., [7] , [8] , [5] . It exploits a bad key initialization in A5/1, the fact that the key and the frame counter are initialized in a linear fashion. This "bad property" enables us to launch a type of correlation attack, which is quite powerful.
In opposite to all other attacks, this attack is (almost) independent of the shift register lengths. Instead, it depends on the number of times that the cipher is clocked before it starts producing the output bits. In A5/1 this number is 100. If this number is increased, the attack becomes weaker, and vice versa. The resulting attack breaks A5/1 in a few minutes without requiring any notable precomputation and without requiring huge storage.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II a brief description of A5/1 is given, and in Section III we present the model and assumptions of the attack. In Section IV we present a basic correlation attack on A5/1. Section V refines the ideas and gives the full attack. In Section VI we present the simulation results for the attack, and finally, in Section VII we give some conclusions.
II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF A5/1
A GSM conversation is sent as a sequence of frames, where one frame is sent every 4.6 millisecond. Each frame contains 114 bits representing the communication from A to B, and another 114 bits representing the communication from B to A. Each conversation is encrypted by a new session key F . For each frame to be sent, the session key F is mixed with a publicly known frame counter, denoted G % , and the result serves as the initial state of the shift registers in the A5/1 generator. It then produces 228 bits of running key, which is xored with the 228 bits of plaintext to produce the ciphertext.
A5/1 consists of three short binary linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) of lengths 19, 22, 23, denoted by R1, R2, R3, respectively. The three LFSRs all have primitive feedback polynomials. The running key of A5/1 is given as the XOR of the output of the three LFSRs, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
The LFSRs are clocked in an irregular fashion. It is a type of Finally, we describe the key initialization. First, the LFSRs are initialized to zero. They are then all clocked 64 times, ignoring the irregular clocking, and the key bits of K are consecutively xored in parallel to the feedback of each of the registers.
In the second step the LFSRs are clocked 22 times, ignoring the irregular clocking, and the successive bits from G % are again xored in parallel to the feedback of each of the registers. Let us call the contents of the LFSRs at this time the initial state of the frame.
In the third step, the three registers are clocked for 100 additional clock cycles with the irregular clocking, but ignoring the output. Then finally, the three registers are clocked for 228 additional clock cycles with the irregular clocking, producing the 228 bits that form the running key.
For all other details around A5/1, like feedback polynomials etcetera, we refer to [2] , where a more detailed description can be found.
III. THE MODEL FOR CRYPTANALYSIS
As mentioned in the previous section, the mode of operation for A5/1 is to xor the running key bits to the plaintext to produce the ciphertext. Denote the running key by
The standard model of an attack on a stream cipher is a known-plaintext attack. In this scenario, the attacker has access to e bits from both the ciphertext and the plaintext and thus, is able to deduce the e first bits of the running key b . In GSM, the digital representation of the conversation is split into frames of length 228 bits. The corresponding knownplaintext assumption is now that the attacker is given access to the running key from f different frames, each running key of length 228 bits. The attack presented here is based on these assumptions. Note that the frames are initialized with the same session key F but with different frame counters G % . Given the keystream, the goal of the proposed attack is to recover the initial state of the running key generator. This is called an initial state recovery attack. In the case of the GSM system the initial state of the shift registers is a linear combination of the publicly known frame counter and the secret session key. By deducing the initial state, we can recover the secret session key.
IV. A BASIC CORRELATION ATTACK
Let us start by giving some fundamental observations. First, from the key initialization description we note that the initial state is a linear function of 
for some known binary constants
, and
. Then we can write
We call the sequence the key part of sequence y and the sequence s is similarly called the frame number part of y . Of course, we can also write 6
is an unknown binary sequence ( ¢ possible sequences) that remains the same for all frames within a conversation (it depends only on F , which is fixed during a conversation). Furthermore,
is a known contribution from the frame counter that is different for each frame. Since the frame number is always known, the above sequence
can be calculated for each frame. For registers R2 and R3 we can, in a similar way, write the output symbols as
with known binary constants v ' 
Let us now present the very basic idea for a correlation attack on A5/1. It will later be considerably refined.
denote the observed running key from A5/1 in a certain frame. Let us consider what is happening after the LFSRs have received their initial values. First, the registers will be clocked irregularly for 100 times, producing no output, then they will be clocked once and the first output symbol will be produced. Since each of the shift registers will clock on average three times out of four, we can expect that after these 101 irregular clockings, each LFSR will have been clocked about 76 times. Assume for a moment that each of the three LFSRs has been clocked exactly 76 times. Then the produced bit c is the XOR of the output of the three LFSRs,
is a known quantity in each frame, we can simply calculate its contribution to the output bit. From (2), (6) and (7) we can rewrite (8) 
Note that the right hand side contains known quantities only. Denote the right hand side of (9) in frame m with n j o l q p l q p l q p p " . Under the assumption that each LFSR has been clocked exactly 76 times, we get one bit of information about the key in frame
Of course, if the assumption is not correct we can expect (10) to hold with probability 2 q D . Hence, we have identified a correlation by calculating
The probability of all three LFSRs being clocked exactly 76 times in this case is calculated to be about 2 e 8 U w . Hence
The left-hand-side expression l q Q l q Q l q remains constant over all frames. It is not hard to show that if we have access to a few million frames, and thus can calculate n j o l q p l q p p l q p p " for each frame, then l q Q l q Q l q can be determined with high confidence.
The value of l q Q l q Q l q will give us one bit of information about the key. By considering other assumed triples for the number of clockings of the three LFSRs, we can derive more information about the key and eventually recover it.
V. A REFINEMENT OF THE ATTACK
The previously described attack is very simple, but has the drawback that it requires many frames. In this section we show how to considerably refine the attack.
Denote the produced keystream after the initialization with the key F and the frame counter This formula will give an exact probability under the assumption of independent uniformly distributed clocking bits. We will use these probabilities to approximate the actual A5/1 case. The approximation works well when the probability is fairly high (as in the considered cases in this paper), since we then have several different initial states that give the desired Table I gives an indication of the validness of the approximation compared to an estimated value based on 100 million simulation of the A5/1 cipher.
We give a small fictitious example to clarify (14) for three different sequences of values Figure 2 , we have chosen
. We see from the tabulated example that if we calculate the sequence
, using the known frame number and the running key b , to be only zeros in the interval , then the probability that the key part t Q t Q t for this specific clocking is zero is fairly high (0.9). If we calculate the same sequence to be only ones, the probability of the key part being zero is low (0.1). Finally, if we have a mix of ones and zeros we see that the zeros are observed at positions where there is a (in total) higher probability of occurrence, so in this case we 
Example of three different sequences estimated bits can be viewed as a received word of length 512, and the corresponding equations are parity check equations for the code. If we have enough frames to make the estimates reasonably accurate, we can decode the received word and find 24 bits from the key.
Since the log-likelihood ratio É represents a soft value of the probability, it is also possible to use a soft decoding algorithm. A soft decoding algorithm would be expected to perform better since it takes more advantage of the given information. We have tried soft decoding but it did not improve the attack notably. When the number of received frames increases, the probability tends to either 8 or 2 quite fast and thus reducing the gain of soft decoding. The reduced complexity of the hard decoding algorithm seems to be a better choice in this case. Table II shows the average, maximum and minimum number of correct estimates of the 512 equations, in a run of 60 simulations, using the procedure described. Using the interval
q from the key part of the registers. Using (3) this will give us
à § C bits of information about the key K (in the form of linear combinations of key bits). To fully recover the key (64 bits) we can increase the length of the interval to 22, such that we get I Q á ¢ Û Q ¤ Ð B D C bits of information about the key, which makes the decoding much harder. Instead, we propose to pick a new subinterval
, thus recovering another 24 bits from the key. Finally, we do the same for the subinterval
. Then we have recovered 24 bits from each shift register output and a total of 72 bits. This is more than what we need for solving for the key K.
The computational work to check a solution consists of first loading the estimated bits into the register, then running the cipher backwards 79 clocks plus additional 22 clocks for the frame number loading. Then loading the frame number in the usual way and run the 100 premix clocks and finally checking the generated keystream output against the received keystream. The maximum number of output bits that we need to check is about B C , since the state space is 64 bits. In a second step, the decoding in our simulations is done by exhaustive search over all possible values of v ' v ' v , where ' ' each runs through the interval . The solution which gives the closest Hamming distance to the received codeword is taken as the correct solution. However, in order to have a high probability that the correct solution is the codeword closest in Hamming distance to the received word, we still need quite many frames. Simulations show that when we have fewer than about 100 000 frames there are often other (erroneous) solutions to the system of equations that give a closer distance. To overcome this problem we save a list of the ä x å 2 d 8 ¢ 8 8 closest solutions for each subinterval. Picking one solution from each list(subinterval), we can combine them into three 24 bit LFSR sequences as allegedly produced by the shift registers. These sequences are then verified by running the cipher backwards as described above.
In the case of using an interval length of 8 we need three subintervals and the number of combinations to verify would amount to ä , which is rather expensive. A more efficient way is to use overlapping intervals where each subinterval overlaps the previous subinterval with 2 or 3 bits. Now we only have to verify combinations that agree in the overlapping bits. We can also use the fact that the sequences we want to verify are 24 bits long and the shift registers are shorter. Thus, a first test if the combined sequence could be the right, is to check whether the last bits of the sequence fulfill the feedback polynomial of each of the shift registers.
Using Table III.   Table IV shows the success rate for different configurations and different number of received frames. The entries are the number of successful attacks out of a batch of 100 runs and in parenthesis are the attack times for each configuration. The corresponding length of the GSM conversation is also given (although this is a known plaintext attack and would not apply directly to the GSM system). The simulations where run on a PC with Intel Pentium 4 processor, running at 1.8Ghz, with 512 MByte of memory using a Linux operating system.
The precomputation phase in the presented attack amounts to calculate and store the probabilities that a certain number of clockings of the registers appears in a certain keystream position. These are the probabilities used in (14). Using the same hardware as in our simulations, it takes about 15 minutes to calculate the required tables and less that 2Mb to store them. We have summarized the implemented attack in Figure 3 . , in the simulations, shows that this clocking has a very small probability of occurring beyond the } 6 õ 2 C ¢ 8 th keystream position (40th position in the running key). So the attack only needs the first 40 bits of the keystream in each frame. Furthermore, the frames used in the attack need not to be consecutive.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a new attack on the A5/1 stream cipher, based on an identified correlation. In contrast to previous attacks, this is not a time-memory trade-off attack, but uses completely different properties of the cipher. It explores the weak key initialization which allows to separate the session key from the frame number in binary linear expressions.
The complexity of the attack is only linear in the length of the shift registers and depends instead on the number of irregular clockings before the keystream is produced. The implemented attack needs the 40 first bits from about ¦ q (possible non-consecutive) frames, which corresponds to about 5min of GSM conversation. Our implementation of the attack shows that we have a high success rate; more than 70%. This can be improved by using larger list size and/or larger interval size. The complexity of the attack using the parameters presented here is quite low and the attack can be carried out on a modern PC in less than 5 minutes using very little precomputation time and memory. The improvements compared to previous work are the following. All previous attacks have a complexity exponential in the shift register length. The complexity of the attack presented in this paper is roughly linear in the shift register lengths.
Previous attacks also need either much precomputation and/or memory or they have a high time complexity. The proposed attack is simple to implement, has been implemented, and completes its task in less than 5 minutes.
Finally, the presented attack also enlightens new interesting design weaknesses in A5/1 that should be considered when constructing new stream ciphers.
